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INTRODUCTION 
 
The water industry is typically a network industry. 
However, this industry has special features because 
water of good quality is essential for the existence of 
human life. Matters of ethics and efficiency are 
therefore inextricably linked together and raise a 
number of fundamental, ethical, and practical questions 
for society.1 In this paper, we look at how the topic of 
drinking water management relates to the traditional 
analysis of natural monopoly regulation and argue that 
regulating natural monopolies, which involve 
irreversible environmental and public health risks, 
changes the usual regulating schemes in such a way that 
risk coverage and insurance premiums must be 
incorporated in the analysis. We emphasize the essential 
nature of water and its quality because of their 
implications for human health and the environment. In 
this context, water and its quality engage the regulator’s 
liability as well as that of the monopolist. We show that 
this complicates the case of no-risk regulation, where 
the objectives of regulation are limited to ensuring that 
water services are offered at a proper price and that the 
firms allowed to benefit from the monopoly are those 
that are the most efficient in using it. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we 
define the characteristics of drinking water management 
and the nature of the natural monopoly, and develop the 
role of the risk and uncertainty that face regulators and 
managers. In Section 3, we use the French case to 
illustrate the problem and present a methodology for 
solving it. Section 4 concludes. 
 
REGULATION OF THE DRINKING WATER 
SECTOR 
 
Drinking Water a Social and Specific Good: Public or 
Private? 
 
Is water a public good? From an economic point of 
view, many of its characteristics would tend to put 
“water” in the private commodity category. Indeed, it 
can be infinitely divided, stored, privately owned, and 
sold on a market, etc. Hence, because of these features it 
may be considered as a private good. For instance, in 
many countries water is sold as a commodity by 
individuals, and the bottled-water industry is growing.2 
However, in most of the developed countries water 
resources are considered as a public good and 
governments reserve the right to establish institutions 
for allocating all water within their boundaries3. From a 
purely ethical standpoint, every person does have a right 
to fresh water access and no consumer may be excluded 
because of price. All this having been said, it appears 
that the jury is still out on the definitive verdict of 
whether water should be classed as a public or a private 
good. In the following paragraph, we use the concept of 
quality to help make the choice.  
 
Consider the principle of equity in the right to life. This 
principle and the essential nature of water rules out 
discrimination, and consequently, the same quality of 
water should be available to everyone in a given 
geographical area. Hence, the public good 
characteristics of water are mainly associated with the 
necessity to keep drinking water as pure and accessible 
as possible. J.S. Mill made the case for water as a public 
good when he wrote:  
 
“the case to which the water-supply of towns 
bears most analogy, are such as the making of roads 
and bridges, the paving, lighting, and cleansing of 
streets. The nearest analogy of all is the drainage of 
towns, with which the supply of water has a natural 
connection. Of all these operations it may 
reasonably be affirmed to be the duty of 
Government, not necessarily to perform them itself, 
but to ensure their being adequately performed. I do 
not say that it ought not to be lawful to build a 
house without proper drainage and proper water-
supply; but assuredly every one who owns or builds 
a house in a town should have the means of effectual 
drainage and water-supply put in his power, at the 
smallest practicable expense (J.S. Mill p.434).” 
 
 
With this in mind, water appears to be a public good 
with private features in its distribution. These are the 
characteristics of a natural monopoly. 
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Drinking Water as a Natural Monopoly 
 
Our definition of a natural monopoly is closely related 
to that of Baumol et al. (1977):  
 
“By natural monopoly we mean an industry whose 
cost function is such that no combination of several 
firms can produce an industry output vector as 
cheap as it can be provided by a single supplier.” 
 
Applied to water management, water utilities are 
monopolies not only because of the economic 
advantages related to scale economies but also because 
of the economic advantages related to technical 
considerations that prevent competition between several 
providers in a given area. The management of a pipe 
network, the related heavy investments, the supply and 
the treatment of water, and sometimes the sewage plants 
necessitate a monopoly. The monopoly is more a result 
of conditions related to the management and 
maintenance of a unique infrastructure of pipes and 
plant than it is with economies of scale. It is difficult to 
imagine competition in the management and 
maintenance of this infrastructure. This leads us to 
consider the irreversibility of the investments in the 
field of water supply.4 
  
Regulating Natural Monopolies Under Risk 
 
More than a century ago, John Stuart Mill observed that 
the  
 
“water supply of London may be provided in 
three ways: by trading companies, as at 
present; by a functionary or a board of 
functionaries appointed by Government; or by 
some local or municipal authority (J.S. Mill 
(1851 p.433).”  
 
Since these early times, the debate has changed very 
little except that, nowadays, nobody would willingly 
empower a board of civil servants to manage a local 
public utility. Hence, the debate is not whether the water 
supply should be privately or publicly managed, but 
rather how to manage regulation efficiently. 
 
The French system of water management is a case in 
point. The relevant regulatory level is essentially 
municipal, and three main types of water management 
are at work at the municipal level. The first type, called 
the “Régie Municipale,” is a system of direct 
management involving the Mayor and its Council where 
the municipality is in charge of the whole management 
system (plants, pipe-network, etc.). The second type, a 
sort of “Super Régie Municipale,” gathers the resources 
of several municipalities to form an association of 
communes. The third type is a delegation system 
whereby the municipality or the “Super Régie 
Municipale,” allows a private firm to manage the 
allocation and the treatment of fresh water and sewage. 
In France, quantitatively, the delegation system is by far 
the most popular.  
 
In a delegation contract, the municipality temporarily 
cedes its management powers to a private firm. The 
delegation can be total or partial, but it is always 
temporary and long term for a period of up to thirty 
years. Full privatization of the water supply, as in the 
United Kingdom for example, is prohibited. At the 
contract’s maturity, control reverts to the municipality, 
which may choose to renew delegation with the existing 
firm or a competitor, or to assume direct management 
itself. Thus, the procedure appears competitive. 
However, because of several factors linked to the 
oligopolistic nature of the water management market in 
general and to the French institutional framework in 
particular, there is no effective competition and the 
delegated firms are able to extract excessive profits at 
the expense of the community of consumers. 
 
When natural monopolies face environmental or health 
risks, as do drinking water utilities, the risks are more 
than simple uncertainty about sales levels and income 
losses. They involve the liability of the regulator for 
environmental and health damages and the necessity for 
him to incorporate them accurately in his strategy. Thus, 
it appears intuitively that these regulation rules should 
be different from those of the generally accepted natural 
monopoly theory where the stakes are limited to the 
levels of supply and demand. Hence, the very notion of 
regulation is changed, and coordination and incentives 
under risk become central concepts. Boyer and Robert 
(1997), for instance, estimate that the electricity 
industry should be regulated as a natural monopoly 
because of the important potential economies of scale 
present in the network activities. Where drinking water 
is concerned, the inefficiency is not related to foregone 
economies of scale, but rather to the risk of irreversible 
damage to both the environment and public health. 
 
Incorporating Risk in the Regulation Scheme: The 
French Case 
 
Efficient regulation means that from an economic and 
institutional standpoint rules are defined so that the 
outcome of the system is equivalent to the outcome of 
competition. Because space is lacking, these points will 
not be developed here but the important aspects of the 
discussion can be found in Boyer and Robert (1997), 
Waterson (1988), Laffont and Tirole (1993). Where the 
role of risk is concerned, two major issues are at work.5 
The first one relates to damage liability and the 
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contractual relationship between principal and agent. 
The second relates to the appropriate pricing rule, given 
the risks associated with both income and damages. 
Because French law explicitly recognizes the role of 
damage liability, we use the French case to illustrate 
these points. 
 
 The Regulator and Damage Liability 
  
The role of damage liability in the French system of 
water management can be summarized as follows: 
According to French law, the municipalities are in 
charge of water resource management, including 
protection of the water supply, river management, and 
pollution control. In this framework, the mayor is 
personally liable for any damage due to negligence on 
his part. The liability is civil, to the extent of all his 
worldly belongings, as well as criminal and is 
transferred to the municipality itself if damages exceed 
the total value of the mayor's net worth. Mayors have 
been prohibited by law from using the municipality to 
insure themselves against this particular risk. 
Furthermore, there is a high level of uncertainty about 
how negligence will be defined by the individual courts. 
All this puts the mayor in a precarious position. By 
delegating authority to a private firm, the mayor can 
eliminate his personal liability, which is transferred to 
the delegated firm. Given the uncertainty surrounding 
the traditional measure of protective cover, delegation 
has consequently become popular with mayors and 
municipalities as an effective instrument in eliminating 
their negligence liability. Herein lies the seed of a costly 
conflict of interest between the personal welfare of the 
mayor and the well being of the community. It is clear 
that the conflict of interest arises from the damage 
liability associated with managing the water supply. 
 
Clark and Mondello (2000a) have shown that this 
problem can be analyzed in the context of insurance 
theory where the cost of the mayor’s guarantee can be 
priced as the value of an insurance policy W 
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where x represents the loss level in the case of a 
catastrophe due to negligence and follows geometric 
Brownian motion 
 
(2)                             )()()()( tdztxdttxtdx sa +=  
r is the riskless rate, a is the rate of growth of the 
potential loss, s  is its standard deviation, dz  is a 
standard Wiener process with zero mean and variance 
equal to dt and rfl ,,  with fl <  are intensity 
parameters of Poisson processes representing 
respectively the arrival rate for losses at the low socially 
mandated precautionary level (low technical and quality 
standards), the arrival rate for losses at the high socially 
mandated precautionary level (high technical and 
quality standards), and the probability per unit of time 
of passing from the low to the high level. 
 
The idea behind the precautionary levels is that with a 
given infrastructure and technology, lower minimum 
technical standards will lead to fewer accidents being 
judged by the courts as caused by negligence. Thus, 
fl < . The reason that passage from one level to 
another is modeled as a random process with r  as the 
instantaneous probability of change is because there is 
no national standard setting board in France. 
Consequently, individual courts are free to decide for 
themselves what the minimum precautionary level 
(technical and quality standard) should be. As might be 
expected in the land of 50 million notoriously 
independent thinkers, the minimum precautionary level 
can and does vary from court to court. 
Equation (1) measures the cost of the agency conflict 
between mayor and community as the value of an 
insurance policy that covers all losses due to negligence 
when there is a doubt about how negligence will be 
defined. The uncertainty about how negligence will be 
defined is embodied in the two socially mandated 
precautionary levels. Thus, equation (1) says that the 
value of the insurance policy covering a low risk that 
might become a high risk is equal to the present value of 
expected cash flows resulting from losses discounted at 
the riskless rate increased by a risk premium r , the 
probability that the change in riskiness will actually 
occur. Thus, it values the personal liability of the mayor 
when there is a possible change in the risk level. This is 
the price (agency cost) that the Community would have 
to pay to cover the mayor's risk as a means of 
eliminating the agency conflict and inducing him to 
make the water management choice that is in the best 
interest of the Community. When formulating a pricing 
policy, the regulator cannot ignore this cost. 
 
The Formulation of an Optimal Pricing Policy When 
Income is Stochastic 
 
In the formulation of an optimal pricing policy, it is 
important to know whether the contractual relationship 
between the firm and the regulator is reversible. The 
problem of delegation irreversibility is tied to economic 
rents and is a consequence of the public authorities 
negotiating disadvantage in the face of the cartelized 
water management firms. It can be described as follows. 
In a delegation contract, a municipality temporarily 
cedes its management powers to a private firm. In 
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France, the law allows partial or total delegation of 
water management, but not a full privatization of the 
water supply as in the United Kingdom.  The contract is 
long term, it is determined by an auction, and it provides 
for the ongoing opportunity to renegotiate prices and 
terms. At the contract's maturity, the municipality 
retains control of the delegation allocation and may 
choose among competitors or even revoke delegation in 
favor of direct management. 6 
 
Changing this situation through legislation is not 
feasible in the foreseeable future since it would require 
a major overhaul of the French governance system with 
significant effects far outside the realm of water 
management. Furthermore, in spite of the 
municipalities’ inherent disadvantage, this same system 
pushes them to opt increasingly for delegation. First of 
all, the technology of monitoring the safety of the 
existing pipe network is fully controlled by a de facto 
cartel of a small number of large, specialized companies 
that monopolize the market and limit the municipalities’ 
access.7  Secondly, the required competencies for water 
management have become more and more specific 
thereby making it difficult and costly for the 
municipalities to find and retain qualified personnel. 
Finally, and most importantly, because of a quirk in the 
French administrative organization there is the above 
mentioned problem of the mayor's personal liability in 
the case of damage when the court judges that the harm 
was caused by negligence. The result of all this is that 
once a municipality has opted for delegation, the 
decision is, for all practical purposes, irreversible. In the 
absence of reversibility, regulation and the formulation 
of an optimal pricing policy come to the fore. 
 
Several pricing rules may be used as regulation tools. 
Among the more theoretically advanced, the most 
popular are Ramsey-Boiteux and the efficient 
component pricing rule (EPCR). Armstrong et al. 
(1994), (1995), (1996), (1998) analyze profit-
maximizing nonlinear pricing by a firm that is subject to 
price cap regulation where they consider the two main 
forms of regulatory constraint: (1) a cap on the firm’s 
average revenue, and (2) a constraint that the firm must 
continue to offer each consumer the option of buying at 
the uniform price. Optimal nonlinear price schedules in 
these regimes are shown to have simple 
characterizations that are related to the nonlinear tariffs 
that an unregulated monopolist would charge. These 
authors show that of the regulatory regimes, the firm 
prefers the average revenue constraint to the option 
constraint and likes uniform pricing least. 
Unfortunately, these theoretical approaches suffer from 
some informational difficulties summarized by Boyer 
and Robert (1997 p.13): 
 
“They are very complex in realistic cases and they 
are open to manipulation, to regulatory capture and 
to predatory behavior because of this complexity and 
because of the fact that there is so much uncertainty 
or imprecision in the estimates of the basic 
parameters or basic variables you have to obtain 
and know to apply them and because of the fact that 
generically, the information structure on costs and 
demands is incomplete.” 
 
Furthermore, they are not dynamic and they fail to 
incorporate compensation for the uncertainty (risk) 
surrounding the monopolist’s income as well as the risk 
associated with damage liability, which for the French 
case, is the cost of the agency conflict. 
 
These shortcomings can be overcome with the tools of 
stochastic  calculus and the techniques developed in real 
option theory. To make the pricing problem dynamic we 
let the monopolist’s income “y” vary stochastically 
through time in geometric Brownian motion 
 
 )()()()( tdztydttytdy yyy sa +=                       (3) 
 
where ya  represents the expected growth rate of 
income, ys  is the standard deviation of the growth rate, 
and ydz  is a standard Wiener process with zero mean 
and variance equal to dt. 
 
The regulatory problem is to determine the cap price 
that includes the potential risk damages that are 
captured in equation (1). Clark and Mondello 
(forthcoming November 2000b) provide a solution 
when the potential risk damages are treated as an annual 
operating cost. To find the solution they ask the 
question, “At what level of income y would it be 
optimal for the municipality to revoke delegation and 
manage the drinking water supply itself?” To 
incorporate the potential damage liability, they let 
c represent operating costs, including the insurance 
premium for liability coverage. As we mentioned above, 
this liability is unlimited and in the case of negligence 
engages the personal responsibility for the mayor-
municipality in the case of direct management and for 
the firm in the case of delegation. In the absence of 
market imperfections where both municipality and the 
firm have equal access to technology and expertise, the 
liability is the same for both. From equation (1) we 
know the value of the liability is equal to W. Since the 
liability is perpetual we calculate its operating cost as a 
perpetual annuity l in the formula Wrl =  or 
rWl = . Thus, the cost of the damage liability is 
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subsummed in the cost side of the investment's cash 
flows.  Finally, assume that within the output capacity 
of the investment operating costs are constant.8  
 
The required risk adjusted rate of return on )(ty  can be 
found by applying the CAPM directly to )(ty .9  The 
required rate of return will be given by 
 
 ,mxr lsrm +=                                                       (4) 
 
where r  is the riskless rate of interest, l  is the market 
price of risk, my ,r  is the correlation coefficient of the 
percentage change in )(ty  with the market rate of 
return and m a> .  Let m a d- = > 0 , which can be 
interpreted as a dividend or convenience yield derived 
from actually owning the investment. 
 
The value of the investment project, ))(( tyF , can then 
be found by setting up a hedge portfolio with a long 
position of one unit of the investment and a short 
position in ))(( tyF ¢  units of )(ty .  Using standard 
methods in stochastic calculus gives the following 
differential equation: 
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The solution to (8) is: 
 
(9)                                                      )()( 21 21
gg tyBtyBF +=
 
Using the boundary conditions in the Appendix gives: 
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Equation (11) gives the maximum income level or the 
cap price for the monopolist. Beyond this point, it is in 
the interest of the municipality to revoke delegation and 
resume direct management. From (11) it is clear that 
damage liability raises the minimum price above what it 
would otherwise be ( 0* >¶¶ cy ). 
 
The foregoing solution to the regulator's problem is 
intuitively appealing with practical advantages. The 
intuition is that the optimal price is where the interests 
of the municipality are just equal to the interests of the 
monopolist and that the associated interests are 
determined by objective economic considerations that 
include the damage liability. The practical advantage is 
that if the revocation threat is credible, the monopolist 
will have an incentive to auto-regulate himself in order 
to avoid losing his contract. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we have shown how the topic of drinking 
water management relates to the traditional analysis of 
natural monopoly regulation. We argue that from a 
purely ethical standpoint, the essential nature of water 
for human existence and welfare makes equal access a 
right and that water is, indeed, a natural monopoly. 
However, regulating natural monopolies, which involve 
irreversible environmental and public health risks, 
changes the usual regulating schemes in such a way that 
damage liability must be included in the analysis.  Using 
the French case as an example because French 
legislation explicitly recognizes the damage liability 
associated with water management, we show that the 
damage liability can be measured as the value of an 
insurance policy associated with any and all losses due 
to negligence on the part of the regulator or his 
delegated manager. Using real options pricing 
techniques, we then show how an optimal pricing policy 
can be determined and how the damage liability can be 
integrated into the analysis. As intuition would have it, 
it turns out that the damage liability raises the cap price.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
The first boundary condition is  
 
(1A)                                                                0)0( =F  
which implies that B2 0= . 
 
The second boundary condition depends on income and the cost of exe rcise.  There will be a value of )(ty , noted 
*y , where it will be optimal for the commune to exercise its option.  At this point it will receive the value of the 
investment V less the cost I of exercising the option.  This cost includes the technology costs, recruiting costs, 
investment costs and indemnities that must be paid if the municipality wants to renew direct management.  Thus, the 
value matching  
 
 
IyVyF -= *)(*)(                                                     (2A) 
 
where V is the present value of the investment's cash flows and I  is the exercise price, i.e. the cost of revoking 
delegation. The smooth pasting condition that makes it possible to find *y  jointly with ))(( tyF  is:  
        
*)(*)( yVyF ¢=¢                                                         (3A) 
 
Solving (2A) and (3A) simultaneously gives the solution in the text. 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Armstrong, Mark &. John S. Vickers. (1991). “Welfare 
Effects of Price Discrimination by a Regulated 
Monopolist.” 22 Rand Journal of Economics, 571-
580. 
 
Armstrong, Mark & John. S. Vickers. (1996). 
“Regulatory Reform in Telecommunications in 
Central and Eastern Europe.” 4 Economics of 
Transition, 295-318. 
 
Armstrong, Mark, Simon Cowan, & John S. Vickers. 
(1994). Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis 
and British Experience. Cambridge (MA), MIT 
Press. 
 
Armstrong, Mark, Simon Cowan, & John S. Vickers. 
(1995). “Nonlinear Pricing and Price-Cap 
Regulation.” 58 Journal of Public Economics, 33-
55. 
 
Armstrong, Mark, Chris Doyle, & John. S. Vickers. 
(1996). “The Access Problem: A Synthesis.” 44 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 131-150. 
 
Armstrong, Mark, Chris Doyle, & John. S. Vickers. 
(1998). “The Access Pricing Problem with 
Deregulation: A Note.” 46 Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 115-121. 
 
Baumol, W. J., E. E Bailey, & R. D. Willig. (1977). 
“Weak Invisible Hand Theorems on the 
Sustainability of Multiproduct Natural Monopoly.” 
American Economic Review, 67, pp.350-65. 
 
Boyer, M., M. Patry, J. Martel. (1996). “L'impartition 
du traitement de l'eau.” Cyrano, al, Juin, 54 pages. 
 
Boyer, M., M. Patry, P. J. Tremblay. (1999).  “La 
Gestion d\'{e}l\'{e}gu\'{e}e de l'eau : les enjeux.” 
Cyrano, Montr\'{e}al, Juin, 52 pages. 
 
Boyer, M., P. Lasserre, M. Poitevin, M. Patry. (1996). 
“L'impartition Municipale: L'argumentaire.” 
Cyrano, Montr\'{e}al, Juin, 52 pages. 
 
Boyer, M., & J. Robert. (1997). Competition and Access 
in Electricity Markets: ECPR, Global Price Cap, 
and Auctions. CIRANO, Scientific Series, 
Montreal. 
 
 78 
Clark, E. & G. Mondello. (2000a). Resource 
Management and the Mayor’s Guarantee in French 
Water Allocation, Environmental and Resource 
Economics. Vol 15 No 2, February, pp 103-113. 
 
- (2000b). Water Management in France: Delegation 
and Irreversibility. Journal of Applied Economics, 
(forthcoming). 
 
Cour des Comptes. (1997). La gestion des Services 
Publics Locaux d’Eau et d’Assainissement. éditions 
du Journal Officiel, Janvier, 1997, Paris. 
 
Laffont, J. J., J. Tirole. (1993). A theory of Incentives in 
Procurement and Regulation. M.I.T. Press. 
 
Mill, J. S. (1851). The regulation of the London Water 
Supply, in Collected Works of J.S. Mill  
 
Ofwat (2000): Tariff Structures and Charges. 1999-2000 
Report. General Direction of Water Services. 
 
Renzetti, S. (1999). “Municipal Water Supply and 
Sewage Treatment: Costs, Prices and Distortions.” 
Canadian Journal of Economics. Vol. 32, 
N.°3.pp.688-704. 
 
Spulber N. & A. Sabbaghi. (1994). Economics of Water 
Resources: From Regulation to Privatization. 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Waterson, M. (1988). Regulation of the Firm an 
Natural Monopoly. Basil Blackwell, New York. 
 
 
END NOTES 
                                                                 
1 The BottledWaterWebTM Copyright 1999 Best Cellar 
Communications, a division of Best Cellar LLC recalls 
that “In 1993 a waterborne outbreak of Cryptosporidum 
in Milwaukee caused an estimated 400,000 residents to 
become ill with flu-like symptoms and a number of 
deaths to those that were immune impaired. Later that 
year a failure of Washington D.C.'s filtration process 
caused elevated turbidity and an increase in diarrhea 
illness in residents of Washington D.C. Water quality 
varies from city to city, street to street, and tap to tap. 
Even the water from one tap can change from day to 
day depending on water treatment techniques and 
blending of different sources. Other inconsistencies in 
tap water come from chlorinating, which kills bacteria 
in water but can produce trihalomethanes (THMs) when 
it interacts with organic matter in water. THMs have 
been found to be carcinogenic. From toxic dumps 
leaking into the aquifers to agricultural pesticides 
turning up in our faucets, our taps are under constant 
                                                                                                      
attack. Even the very delivery system that brings our tap 
water from the reservoir to our glass has been found to 
contain lead, copper, radon and a potpourri of other 
contaminants that can cause everything from severe 
headaches to cancer.” 
2 In poor countries for instance, drinking water is 
privately supplied by individuals in little tanks and 
prices are settled on the distribution time, the quantity, 
etc. 
3 See for instance Spulber and Sabbaghi (1994 chap.9). 
4 To a full treatment of the natural monopoly question 
see for instance Boyer and Ali (1997) 
5 That does not mean that in the water industry, 
relationships between agents are restricted to only two 
contractual ones (see for instance the relationships 
between stockholders and manager, employees and 
manager etc) as for usual firms. 
6 Although the procedure appears equitable and 
competitive, in fact, as the Cour des Comptes concluded 
in its report of January 1997, because of the French 
governance tradition that is extremely exacting with 
respect to the municipalities’ duties and obligations and 
that also allows de facto cartelisation, fair competition is 
seldom achieved. 
7 In France, for example, La Compagnie Generale des 
eaux, the Lyonnaise des Eaux-Dumez, and the SAUR 
linked to the Bouygues Group are the main leaders that 
also control a large network of subsidiaries. 
8 This assumption implies that either there is a single 
given technology or that technology changes affect 
water quality but not cost. Technology and changes in 
technology, while important in a more general context, 
are only peripheral to the problem at hand. Furthermore, 
the great majority of operating costs in water 
management accrue to depreciation, which is fixed or 
has a fixed schedule, and skilled labor. Because of 
social legislation that eliminates temporary layoffs and 
the specialized skills required for water management 
that make temps a limited commodity, labor costs are 
also fixed for all practical purposes. Thus, variable 
operating costs are a small percentage of total operating 
costs. Consequently, the assumption of constant 
operating costs is not too unrealistic. Since this 
assumption simplifies the mathematics and makes the 
model more intuitively appealing, we have much to gain 
and little to lose by it. 
9. In France y(t) is directly observable in so far as water 
companies are required by law to furnish the authorities 
with regular, detailed information on quantities and 
prices. If  )(ty  were not directly observable, a 
spanning asset could be substituted. An alternative 
method in the absence of a reliable spanning asset is to 
assume risk neutrality. 
 
